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ABSTRACT
Decentralization has been put forward as a powerful tool to reduce poverty and improve governance
in Africa. The aim of this paper is to study the existence, and identify the nature, of spillovers resulting
from local expenditure policies. These spillovers impact the efficiency of decentralization. We develop
a two-jurisdiction model of public expenditure, which differs from existing literature by capturing
the extreme poverty of some local governments in developing countries through a generalized notion
of the Nash equilibrium, namely, the constrained Nash equilibrium. We show how and under which
conditions spillovers among jurisdictions induce strategic behaviours from local officials. By estimating
a spatial lag model for a panel data analysis of the 77 communes in Benin from 2002 to 2008, our
empirical analysis establishes the existence of the strategic complementarity of jurisdictions' public
spending. Thus, any increase in the local public provision in one jurisdiction should induce a similar
variation among the neighbouring jurisdictions. This result raises the issue of coordination among
local governments, and more broadly, it questions the effeciency of decentralisation in developing
countries in line with Oates' theorem.
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1 Introduction
For two decades, decentralisation has been implemented by a large number of developing coun-
tries, especially in Africa. The World Bank in particular views this devolution as one of the
major economic reforms on its agenda. In response to the failure of central states to lead the
countries’ development, or to limit the risk of civil conflicts in ethnically fragmented nations,
decentralisation is perceived as a way to ensure political stability, to improve accountability and
responsiveness of local leaders, to increase the eﬃciency of public policies, and ultimately, to
reduce poverty.
Two main (and nonexclusive) arguments might explain this infatuation with decentrali-
sation in developing countries. The first one is what we can call the “proximity principle”:
decentralisation moves local public decision makers closer to citizens. By doing this, decen-
tralisation improves preference matching by providing greater diversity in public services to
a heterogeneous population (Oates, 1972). Moreover, by reducing informational asymmetries
between those in power and those governed, decentralisation should induce a higher degree of
accountability in governments and greater eﬃciency in public spending. The second principle
dates at least from the time of Tiebout’s research (1956), and may be called the “competition
principle.” Indeed, decentralisation is supposed to induce some interjurisdictional competition
among political powers: “voting with feet” and yardstick competition (Salmon, 1987) may be
other ways to increase the eﬃciency of public spending.
However, the literature on decentralisation in developing countries essentially focuses on
the proximity principle. Bardhan (2002) finds that “the institutional context” (and therefore
the structure of incentives and organisation) in both developing and transition economies is
quite diﬀerent from those of advanced industrial economies. This author recommends going
“beyond the traditional fiscal federalism literature,” which is essentially associated with the
competition principle. To some extent, most developing countries would not meet implicit or
explicit assumptions posed by the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism.1 The Tiebout
model could not be applied to developing countries where the population mobility appears
to be strongly limited. Then, the existence of a yardstick competition is at least debatable
1 See Oates (2005) and Vo (2010) for comprehensive surveys of this literature specifying the first and second-
generation theories of fiscal federalism.
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in the context of young democracies. Finally, apart from the corruption issue emphasized
by Prud’homme (1995) or Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005), developing countries face some
administrative capacity constraints that the rich countries do not suﬀer.
These pitfalls have induced the literature on decentralisation in developing countries to focus
on the eﬀectiveness of the first argument, the proximity principle. For instance, Faguet (2004)
shows that decentralisation in Bolivia has improved the responsiveness of public investment
to local needs. Alderman (2002) establishes that Albanian local oﬃcials manage antipoverty
programs more accurately and cost eﬀectively than a central government agency since they are
better informed. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) and Galasso and Ravallion (2005) have also
highlighted that decentralisation improves antipoverty policies, in particular, through better
intraregional targeting. These analyses suggest that decentralization may lead to poverty re-
duction through a bottom-up process. However, none of these authors consider the other side
of decentralisation, the competition principle, which stresses the jurisdictions’ interactions.
The aim of this paper is to study the relevance of the competition principle in a developing
economy. This principle relies on the existence of local public goods spillovers, which are well
documented in developed countries. Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Sole-Olle (2006), Redoano
(2007) or Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) estimate expenditure reaction functions and pro-
vide empirical evidence on expenditure spillovers among (local) governments in the US, EU,
Spain, and France, respectively. In the context of decentralisation, an important distinction be-
tween developing and developed countries concerns the limited administrative capacities which
the rich countries do not face. This constraint may be suﬃcient in explaining the absence of
any strategic behaviour among local governments in poor countries and to justify the current
dominant approach of decentralisation in developing economies.
To deal with the extreme poverty of some developing countries’ local governments, and
their very limited administrative capacities, we develop a theoretical framework where two ju-
risdictions determine their level of public good in the presence of spillovers. We consider a
generalized version of Nash equilibrium, that is, constrained Nash Equilibrium, which distin-
guishes our framework from preceding studies in fiscal federalism. We establish the conditions
under which interactions among local governments emerge. Our empirical strategy consists of
estimating expenditure reaction functions and looking for interactions between geographically
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or ethnically closes jurisdictions. It relies on a spatial lag model for a panel data set of the 77
communes of Benin (2002—2008), a representative African country. We unambiguously estab-
lish the existence of local expenditure interactions, contingent on a suﬃcient level of local fiscal
resources. Moreover, we tackle the theoretical vagueness inherent to the nature of interjurisdic-
tional competition: local public spending figures are strategic complements. Interactions exist
not only between neighbouring communes, but also among those that are similar in terms of
ethnic composition.
Our analysis contributes to a more comprehensive view of decentralisation in developing
countries. It is in line with some previous work, such as that of Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf
(2005) or Arze, Martinez-Vasquez, and Puwanti (2008) who consider local governments’ inter-
actions: the former analyzes decentralised health care in Uganda, and the latter investigates
local public spending in Indonesia.2 Decentralisation induces strategic behaviours even in an
African country like Benin. Moreover, the nature of these interactions, that is strategic com-
plementarity, raises the issue of coordination between local governments. The level of spillovers
is a condition that is critical to the eﬃciency of decentralisation, as Oates (1972) highlights.
Finally, the interjurisdictional interactions that we highlight may involve some kind of competi-
tion among local governments. The competition principle and the proximity principle are both
at work in developing countries. Their final eﬀect in terms of the populations’ welfare remains,
however, to appreciate.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 develops a theoretical
analysis of local public spending interactions, taking into account the resource constraints of
some local governments. In Section 3, after a brief overview of Benin, we test the existence of
interactions among Beninese local governments between 2002 and 2008. Section 4 discusses the
main results by exploring the relevance of two mechanisms of the competition principle: voting
with feet and yardstick competition. Section 5 concludes and raises some future challenges to
appreciate the decentralisation’s eﬃciency in the presence of the strategic complementarity of
local oﬃcials’ behaviour.
2 Chavis (2009) studies the eﬀect of competition on decentralization eﬃciency in Indonesia. The author
considers the extent to which the cost per square meter of road project decreases in the number of villages that
compete to obtain grants from the central government. The appreciation of competition is limited to the number
of competitors. There is no analysis of interactions.
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2 Theoretical background
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model to capture the behavioral logic of local
governments in determining the levels of public spending in a developing country. We take into
account some constraints on these strategic behaviours that result from the extreme poverty of
some local governments. Indeed, during 2002—2008, the poorest communes in Benin–Bassila,
Cobly, Kandi, and Kari-Mama–respectively display average levels of per capita annual re-
sources of 168, 526, 734, and 861 CFAF (respectively equivalent to $0.31, $0.97, $1.35, and
$1.58). Finally, beyond its realism, the proposed framework is built in such a way as to fit with
our empirical tools and their underlying assumptions, in particular those of spatial econometrics.
2.1 The model
We consider two jurisdictions ( and ) of the same level. We do not study political issues
and then adopt a normative approach. The utility function of a representative individual in
jurisdiction  is given by   (  ), where  is the private consumption,  the public
spending in jurisdiction , and  is an exogenous non negative parameter, which represents
the degree of spillover eﬀect for inhabitants in jurisdiction  from the public goods provided in
jurisdiction . We consider situations where spillovers are not symmetric ( 6= ).3 We define
 = (  ).
Since spatial empirics use weighting matrices for the strategic variables (), the unique
consistent aggregation technology of local public goods is the weighted summation. Thus, it
follows:
  (  ) =   (  + ) 
where the weight is the parameter  .
Our analysis focuses exclusively on current local public spending, since it is better controlled
by local governments than investment expenditures. Indeed the latter are often ordered and
financed by the central government. Current spending is a mix of public and merit goods.
We are not able to say whether local public spending is a complement or a substitute for
3 This assumption is linked to our empirical work, as well. Since proximity matrices are normalized, their sum
is equal to unity for each . Thus, we have  =  if, and only if, jurisdictions  and  have the same number
of neighbors for a proximity matrix based on contiguity.
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private consumption. Thus, without loss of generality concerning our analysis of jurisdictions’
interactions, we consider a quasi-linear utility function where both local public spending and
private consumption are Edgeworth-independent:
  (  + ) =  +  ( + ) 
where the function  () is the appreciation of local public goods in jurisdiction  (assumed to
be identical accros jurisdictions). This function is increasing in its argument 0 ()  0. The sign
of its second derivative, however, remains indeterminate. Indeed the concavity of function  (),
which is often assumed in the literature, would restrict our theoretical analysis of jurisdictional
interactions to a case of strategic substitutes.
We ignore the issue of local debt, which is the focus of an important literature on soft budget
constraints. Very few countries in Africa allow their local governments to run into debt. Thus,
private consumption is equal to net income, and the local government faces the following hard
budget constraint:
 =  +  ()  (1)
where  is the income of jurisdiction  and  () is the cost of providing an amount  of local
public goods. This cost is assumed to be increasing and convex: ()  0 and 
2()
2  0.
This convexity reflects the increasing marginal cost of public funds. Since we focus on current
spending and not on public investments, we ignore scale economies. This assumption is not
rejected by a preliminary empirical test on our data.4 In order to have some interior solutions
when the jurisdiction is not constrained by its wealth, we assume that
∀  00 ()  00 ( + )  (2)
The convexity of the cost function of public spending must be superior to the variation of the
marginal utility of public goods. This condition obviously holds if the function  () is concave.
Substituting the expression of the private consumption given by (1) into the initial welfare
4 We show the absence of scale economies in providing current public spending according to the jurisdiction’s
size (measured by the population density, ). Both signs of first and second derivatives are positive and
significantly diﬀerent from zero: = 3751∗∗ + 0001∗∗∗2 . Detailed results are provided in Table 1 in
the appendix.
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function, we obtain the following objective function, denoted by  , which only depends on the
strategic variables ( ):
  ( ) =  −  () +  ( + ) 
Each local government chooses its level of public spending, considering the level of public
goods in the other jurisdiction to be given. The played game is static and the Nash equilibrium
may be constrained. Indeed, we take into account situations where a local government is too
poor to finance the minimum of public spending. For instance, in 2007, some Beninese communes
like Lalo, So-Ava, and Materi, had total budgets respectively equal to $15,432; $31,148; and
$32,955, which correspond to total per capita revenues of $0.17, $0.35, and $0.33. During the
same period, Cotonou had a municipal budget about 1,000 times higher ($19 millions or $26
per capita) than the poorest communes. These financial gaps incite us to generalize the notion
of Nash equilibrium by considering a constrained Nash equilibrium denoted by ∗ (),
∗ () = min { e ()} 
where  is given by the budget constraint:  −  () = 0; and e () is the solution of the
unconstrained Nash equilibrium:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
e () ≡ argmax>0  
³
 ∗
´
e () ≡ argmax>0   (  ∗ )
The set of strategies for each jurisdiction  is compact and corresponds to [0 ]. The First
Order Condition (FOC) of the preceding program for commune  is
− () + 
0 ¡ + ∗ ()¢ = 0 (3)
The Second Order Condition (SOC) is respected under condition (2).
We focus on the nature of competition among jurisdictions when it exists. These strategic
interactions are captured through the sign of  . Following Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer
(1985), we define local public goods as strategic complements (resp. substitutes) if, and only
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if, the marginal utility of public good in jurisdiction  is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the
level of local public goods in the other jurisdictions, more formally, if 
2()
  0 (resp.
 0). If jurisdiction  is constrained by its wealth, that is, if  (e ())  , we have ∗ =  and
 = 0; otherwise ∗ = e ()  and the application of the envelope theorem to (3) yields:

 = −
2()

2()
2
 (4)
Since the denominator corresponds to the SOC of the maximization program, the sign of  is
then equivalent to the sign of 
2()
 , which also corresponds to the sign of 00 ().5
2.2 Comparative statics
We will now consider a unilateral change in the degree of the spillovers experienced in jurisdiction
 from jurisdiction . In so doing, we can compare the impact of an increase of public spending
by a neighbouring jurisdiction, and the same variation of a more distant jurisdiction, on the level
of public spending in jurisdiction i. In other words, we estimate the consequences of geographic
or ethnic proximity on local governments’ public spending.
For comparative statics analysis, we follow Caputo (1996). Indeed, unlike single-agent mod-
els, knowledge of how a parameter aﬀects the marginal value of the  th player’s decision variables
in a static game is not suﬃcient to determine the Nash equilibrium’s comparative statics for
the level of the  th player’s decision variables. We also must determine how the parameter’s
change aﬀects the other player’s best reply, and finally, how these last variations impact the
marginal value of the  th player’s decision variable.
Considering the unconstrained Nash equilibrium (∀ ∗ () = e ()) the diﬀerentiation of
(3) with respect to  for both jurisdictions yields:
⎛
⎜⎝
 11 () 00 ()
00 ()  11 ()
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
()
()

⎞
⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎝
−e () 00 ()
0
⎞
⎟⎠ 
5 If this last expression is positive, then the game played by each jurisdiction is supermodular and at least
one equilibrium exists.
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Applying the Cramer rule we then obtain:
() = −()| | 00 (e () + e ()) 11 (e ()  e ()) 
()
 =
()
| | 00 (e () + e ()) 00 (e () + e ())  (5)
where  is the Jacoby matrix and its determinant is given by
| | =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯  11 (e ()  e ()) 00 (e () + e ())
00 (e () + e ())  11 (e ()  e ())
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯  (6)
Generally, the sign of | | remains indeterminate since it does not rely on the sign of the Hessian
matrix of a single optimisation problem, as Caputo (1996) asserts. Thus, without additional
assumptions about the stability or uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, for instance, we cannot
sign | |. We then obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Under our assumptions, we have:
() If the jurisdiction  is constrained by its wealth ( (e ())  ), a change in  has no eﬀect
on the level of provided public goods in both jurisdictions;
() If the jurisdiction  is constrained by its wealth, a change in  has no eﬀect on the level
of provided public goods in jurisdiction  but increases (decreases) the level of public goods in
jurisdiction  if public goods are strategic complements (substitutes); and
() If no jurisdiction is constrained, an increase in the degree of spillover from jurisdiction 
to  () involves a variation in the same (opposite) sense in both jurisdictions if local public
goods are strategic complements (substitutes).
Proof. () If ∗ () =  it is then obvious that 
∗ () = 0 and
∗ ()
 = 0 from diﬀerentiation
of (3) with respect to  .
() If ∗ () =  and ∗ () = e (), then we have ∗ () = 0, which yields
∗ ()
 = −
00
¡ + ¢
2 ()
2

which is positive if the function  () is convex, or equivalently if local public goods are strategic
complements given (4).
() If ∗ () = e () and ∗ () = e (), we obtain from (5)
e ()

e ()
 = −
µe () 00 (e () + e ())
| |
¶2
00 (e () + e ()) 11 (e ()  e ()) 
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The parameter  represents the degree of ‘proximity’ that jurisdiction  experiences from
the local public goods provided by jurisdiction . This proximity will be expressed in geographic
or ethnic terms in our empirical analysis. An increase in  may represent, for instance, the
reduction of the transportation costs to move across communes  and , or a stronger similarity
in their ethnic compositions. Such variations would induce two eﬀects on , a direct eﬀect, and
an indirect (strategic) one, through the level of public goods provided by the neighbour ().
If jurisdiction  is constrained by its wealth, any change in  does not aﬀect the equilibrium
value. Indeed, as the level of public spending in this jurisdiction is a corner solution, neither the
direct eﬀect nor the strategic eﬀect would come into play. If the other jurisdiction, namely , is
constrained, then only the direct eﬀect of  would influence . An increase of  induces an
increase (decrease) in  when local public expenditures are strategic complements (substitutes).
Finally, if no jurisdiction is constrained, then both eﬀects are at play. Without additional
assumptions, however, particularly on the sign of | |, we can only conclude that an increase in
 would induce increases or decreases in levels of local public goods in both jurisdictions in
the presence of strategic complements. Otherwise, in the presence of strategic substitutes, an
exogenous change of  would involve opposite variations among jurisdictions.
Following Dixit (1986) or Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987), we assume the uniqueness and the
stability of the Nash equilibrium through the following assumption:6
| |  0 (7)
This relation enables us to pinpoint the types of variations resulting from the two aforementioned
kinds of parameter changes. We obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Under our assumptions and (7), we find the following:
() An increase in the degree of spillover from jurisdiction  to  () entails an increase in the
level of public goods in both jurisdictions if local public goods are strategic complements, and
() an increase in the degree of spillover from jurisdiction  to  () entails a decrease in the
level of public goods in jurisdiction , and an increase in the level of public goods in jurisdiction 
if local public goods are strategic substitutes.
6 If we adopt the contraction approach (see Vives, 1999), the condition of equilibrium uniqueness involves
 11 ( ) +
12 ( )
  0
which yields that | | is positive.
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Proof. Immediate from (5).
Assuming the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium allows us to specify the type of deviation
from public spending when the degree of spillovers varies. To sum up our theoretical results,
we show that spillovers among jurisdictions may involve strategic behaviours, which in turn
lead to a competition process. However, the presence of local public goods spillover is not a
suﬃcient condition of strategic behaviours among communes. Without restricting the nature
of such a competition, we estimate to what extent the level of provided public good is aﬀected
by a deviation in the degree of spillover.7
Our theoretical framework yields the following implications:
1. The provision of local public goods with spillovers may induce two cases:
(a) Strategic interactions in terms of complements or substitutes (classical result);
(b) The lack of strategic interactions due to the insuﬃcient level of fiscal resources,
despite positive externalities (largely ignored by the relevant literature);
2. Under the presence of strategic complements, the expected quantity of public goods in
jurisdiction  will positively depend on the level of public goods allocated by jurisdiction
; In the presence of strategic substitutes, an opposite relationship is expected.
3 Empirical evidence of public spending interactions in a less
developed country: The case of Benin
Our empirical analysis focuses on Benin, a young democracy. After a brief overview of this coun-
try’s history, we test the existence of strategic interactions among local governments’ spending
by estimating a spatial dynamic econometric model.
3.1 Benin overview
With a per capita income of $570 in 2007, and a ranking of 163 out of 177 countries,8 Benin
remains one of the poorest nations in the world. As with many African countries, Benin is
7 Proposition 2 () is similar to Proposition 8 in Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007), who consider only the case
of strategic substitutes.
8 Human Development Report (2007).
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ethnically fragmented with about 42 recorded ethnicities (see Figure 2).9 Since its independence
on August l, 1960, the history of Benin has been chaotic. A succession of military governments
ended in 1972, with the last military coup being led by Mathieu Kerekou, who established
a government based on Marxist-Leninist principles. A move to democracy began in 1989.
Two years later, free elections ushered in former Prime Minister Nicephore Soglo (a former
World Bank oﬃcial) as President. Kerekou regained power in 1996, during elections fraught
with irregularities, and won the subsequent election in 2001. Having served two terms and
being over 70, he was ineligible to run in the presidential elections of 2006. He was succeeded
by Thomas Boni Yayi, an independent political outsider who had previously headed the West
African Development Bank. In March 2007, President Yayi Boni strengthened his position after
the legislative elections, where his coalition, Force Cauris pour un Benin Emergent (FCBE),
won the largest number of seats (35 out of 83), and negotiated a progovernment majoritarian
coalition in Parliament with seven minor parties.
This democratic evolution was accompanied by a huge transformation of the political and
administrative organisation. Since 1998, Benin has undergone a decentralisation process that
became eﬀective with the first local elections in 2002—2003. The second local elections took
place in 2008.10 As depicted in Figure 1, Benin is divided into twelve départements which, after
decentralisation, were subdivided into 77 communes, themselves divided into 546 districts. Dé-
partements are managed by a representative of the central government. In contrast, communes
are governed by a directly elected local government. The average size of commune, presented
in the following map, reaches about 90,000 inhabitants.
Insert Map 1
In January 1999, Law 97-029 shifted the transferred competencies from the central gov-
ernment to the 77 communes. Theoretically, competencies of Beninese communes range from
elementary school to economic development, and include the transport infrastructure, environ-
ment (hygiene), health and social goods, tourism, security and marketplace management. As
9 Among the 42 ethnic groups, the most prominent are the Fon and the Adjas in the south, the Baribas and
the Sombas in the north, and the Yorubas in the southeast. As Figure 2 displays, the north is less fragmented
and less urbanized than the south.
10 The first round of municipal elections was held on December 15, 2002 and the second round took place on
January 19, 2003, with an average rate of turnout estimated at 70 percent.
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in most of African countries, however, an adequate transfer of resources did not accompany
this competencies transfer. Beninese communes are characterised by very low levels of re-
sources (only about 4.5 percent of country tax revenues, or equivalently 0.7 percent of GDP).11
Moreover, important inequalities appear between communes: the resources of the ten poor-
est communes represent 5 percent of the five richest ones (see Figure 3 for the DHS score by
commune).
Insert Maps 2 and 3
3.2 Econometric framework
Horizontal interactions entail a fiscal reaction function that depicts how the decision variable
for a given jurisdiction depends on the decisions of other jurisdictions. To test the existence and
the strength of such functions, we test spatial dependence in a panel data framework. Following
the relevant empirical literature, we consider a specification, in the most general form, in which
commune  public expenditure in year , defined by , is a function of its neighbours’ same
public choice, . It gives the following specification:
 =
X

  +  +  +  (8)
where  = 1      denotes a commune and  = 1      a time period; , , and  are unknown
parameters; and  a random error. We allow  to depend on a vector of specific controls
 and we include a commune-specific eﬀect, . In this way, we correct for all time-invariant
communes’ characteristics, observed or unobserved.
Since there are too many parameters  to be estimated, the usual procedure is to consider:
 =  +  +  +  (9)
where  =
X   is the weighted average vector of public spending in the set of the other
11 Local resources are mainly communes’ own resources (about 70 percent). Property taxes and licenses for
exercising a trade or profession (patente) represent 90 percent of local tax revenues (see Chambas, 2010 for a
detailed analysis of local fiscal resources in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Benin). Retroceded taxes, which
come from transfers of state tax revenue to local governments, account for about 10 percent of local resources.
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local governments  at time .
We explore a variety of weighting schemes to allow diﬀerent patterns of spatial interac-
tions. First, we choose a common geographical definition of neighbouring jurisdictions based on
a contiguity matrix, denoted by , where the value 1 is assigned if two jurisdictions share
the same border, and 0 otherwise. Second, we define an ethnic weight matrix, , based on
the ethnic proximity of communes’ inhabitants. In so doing, we test the existence of spending
interactions between communes that are similar with respect to ethnicity. Finally, we consider
two benchmark weighting schemes: a uniform weight matrix
¡¢ where weights are assumed
to be identical for all communes  and a ‘placebo’ weight matrix ¡¢ where weights are
random.12 The uniform scheme captures the critique of Manski (1993): the interdependence
of fiscal choices may result from a “common intellectual trend” that drives fiscal choices in the
same directions and not from jurisdictions’ strategic behaviours. The placebo matrix, also used
in Lockwood and Migali (2009), ascertains that observed interactions are not an artefact of the
estimation procedure.13
In order to take into account the persistence in public expenditure, we consider a dynamic
version of equation (9) and introduce the lagged dependent variable −1 as a right-hand side:
 = −1 +  +  +  +  (10)
Regression (10) raises some important econometric issues as described by Brueckner (2003).
First, public spending is jointly determined. Thus neighbours’ decisions are endogenous and
correlated with the error term . Ordinary least squares estimation of the parameters is then in-
consistent, requiring alternative estimation methods based on the instrumental variables method
(IV) or on maximum likelihood (ML). Second, the omission of explanatory variables that are
spatially dependent may generate spatial dependence in the error term, which is given by:
 = + 14 Ignoring spatial error dependence may provide false evidence of strategic in-
teraction. To deal with such a problem, two approaches are available: the ML estimator, which
12 We generate a random number distributed between 0 and 1 for each commune. The weight assigned between
two communes is the diﬀerence between its random numbers.
13 Weights are normalized so that their sum equals unity for each  for all weight matrices. This assumes that
spatial interactions are homogeneous: each neighbor has the same impact on the commune.
14 Using a data panel helps to eliminate spatial error dependence which arises through spatial autocorrelation
of omitted variable, since the influence of such variables is partly captured in community-specific intercept terms.
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takes into account the error structure (see Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993), or the IV method,
which yields consistent estimations even with spatial error dependence.15 Previous analysis of
local governments’ interactions16 use the tests of Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon (1996), to
verify the hypothesis of error independence, since these are not contaminated by uncorrected
spatial error dependence and may detect the presence of spatial lag dependence. However as
Nickell (1981) mentions, the introduction of a lagged dependent variable induces the inconsis-
tency of the previous estimators. We then use the GMM System estimator after verifying the
hypothesis of error independence and estimating the static model with the ML estimator. This
econometric strategy is commonly shared in the relevant literature. The GMM estimators allow
us to control for both unobserved country-specific eﬀects and the potential endogeneity of the
explanatory variables. We also introduce a trend variable,  to capture shocks in each period,
which are common to all local governments, and other specific controls commonly used in the
empirical literature. We then obtain:
 = −1 +  + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4
+5−1 + 6 + 7+1 + 8 +  + 
(11)
where  is the population density of jurisdiction  on year , which captures scale economies
in public spending and may be spatially distributed.17 Due to the lack of data at the commune
level for appreciating wealth variations, we consider the employment rate in department  on
year , denoted by . It enables a partial control of common shocks that would also be
spatially correlated. The variable  is a trade openness measure at country level that controls
for macroeconomic shocks, since developing countries are vulnerable to foreign trade (Rodrik,
1998).18 Other control variables are introduced in regression (11): a dummy variable, denoted
by , captures some partisan eﬀects;19 and dummies for election years, denoted by −1, 
15 With the IV approach, a typical procedure is to use the weighted average of neighbors’ control variables as
instruments (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). The ML method consists in using a nonlinear optimization routine
to estimate the spatial coeﬃcient  (see Brueckner, 2003).
16 For instance, Brueckner (1998), Brueckner and Saavedra (2000), Saavedra (2000) or Foucault, Madies, and
Paty (2008).
17 Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometer. Per capita expenditures and population
density are in log. Per capita expenditures are corrected for inflation.
18 We measure trade openness as a ratio of total foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP, as it is the one
most often used in empirical studies.
19 The variable takes the value 1 if the local government in jurisdiction  has the same partisan aﬃliation as
the president in oﬃce. Until he stepped down in March 2006, Mathieu Kérékou enjoyed strong support in the
north of the country (Alibori, Atacora, Borgou, and Donga), which was considered his fief. When Boni Yayi
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and +1, allow one to test the opportunistic behaviour hypothesis of local policymakers.20 With
respect to our theoretical results (Proposition 1),  6= 0 involves the existence of some strategic
interactions. Moreover,   0 (  0) means that an increase in the degree of spillovers involves
a variation in the same (opposite) sense of local public goods levels, that is public spending is
a strategic complement (substitute).
In the theoretical section, we also highlight the point that strategic interactions may be
restricted by the extreme poverty of some local governments. To test this hypothesis, we define
a common indicator of fiscal autonomy, denoted by , which is the ratio of jurisdictions’ own
resources to their total resources, and we consider the following specification:
 = −1 +  +  + 1 + 2 + 3
+4 + 5−1 + 6 + 7+1 + 8 +  + 
(12)
where  = ∗ . If strategic interactions are actually contingent on each commune’s
fiscal autonomy, we should observe that the coeﬃcient of  is not significant; and that the co-
eﬃcient of  is significant and positive (negative) if public spending is strategic complements
(substitutes).
3.3 Results
Our dataset covers the 77 communes of Benin for the period 2002—2008. The communes’ data
for current spending come from the Beninese Ministry of Finance and Economy. The other
control variables are drawn from World Development Indicators, Afrobarometers, Demographic
and Health Surveys, and 77 monographs provided by the European Union.
First, we investigate whether or not jurisdictions’ public spending figures are correlated,
and which are the more likely sources of correlation, spatial lag or spatial error dependence.
We follow Anselin, Le Gallo, and Jayet (2006), who proposed two in-depth tests, based on
the Lagrange multiplier principle for panel data indicating the most likely source of spatial
dependence. We first estimate (11) using OLS for both contiguity and ethnic matrix without
was elected, he aﬃrmed his desire for political openness. His fiefs are concentrated in the south of the country,
in particular, Atlantic, Collines, and Mono. Finally, about 40 percent of the departments have shared the same
partisan aﬃliation as the president in oﬃce.
20 −1, , and +1 are dummy variables that take the value 1 the year before, the year of, and the year
after the election, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
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taking into account the influence of public spending in other jurisdictions ( = 0), and the
lagged value of our dependent variable ( = 0). Spatial tests results are shown in Table 2. They
indicate the presence of spatial lag dependence for public spending, but not the existence of
spatial error dependence for both matrices.
Second, since the hypothesis of error independence is verified, we estimate (11) using ML
with specific eﬀects for both contiguity and ethnic matrices without taking into account the
lagged value of our dependent variable ( = 0). However, we consider the influence of the
expenditure set by other jurisdictions ( 6= 0). The estimation results are presented in Table 3.
The coeﬃcient of the weight average vector is always significant and positive.
Finally, the one step robust system GMM provides an estimation of our dynamic model (11)
for all weighting schemes, taking into account the lagged value of the dependent variable ( 6= 0).
We adopt the assumption of weak exogeneity in employment rates and trade openness while
other explanatory variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous. The weighted average vector
of per capita public spending of other local governments is, as noted before, suspected of being
endogenous. The lagged levels of variables are used as instruments in the regressions in level as
well as in the regressions in diﬀerence. We collapse instruments and limit their number since too
many instruments would lead to an inaccurate estimation of the optimal weight matrix, biased
standard errors, and, therefore, incorrect inference of overidentification tests (see Roodman,
2009).21 Table 4 displays estimation results.
Insert Table 4
We focus our attention on (1) (2) (3) (4) and (5), that is, the system GMM estimations
for contiguity, ethnicity, uniformity, and placebo matrices. First we note: () the orthogonal-
ity conditions are respected,22 () the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable is always
21 The lags of at least two earlier periods for weak exogenous variables, and three earlier periods for endogenous
variables, are used as instruments. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lags of the dependent
variable from at least two earlier periods. We use two lags for endogenous and weak exogenous variables.
22 The consistency of the estimator depends on whether or not lagged values of explanatory variables are
valid instruments. The criteria for the selection of instruments are found in two specification tests (Arellano
and Bond, 1991). With the Hansen test, we test the null hypothesis of the overall validity of the instruments’
orthogonality conditions. The second test concerns the serial correlation of residuals. It examines the hypothesis
that the residuals from the first-diﬀerentiated estimating equation are not second-order correlated. In our case,
both statistics confirm the validity of the instruments used.
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significant and positive, confirming the consistency of the autoregressive specification,23 and
() after correcting for endogeneity, the coeﬃcient of the the weighted average vector of public
spending in the set of the other local governments is significant at least at a 1 percent level,
and positive for ethnic and contiguity matrices.
Following Manski (1993), these preliminary results are not suﬃcient to conclude that strate-
gic interactions exist. Indeed, a common trend would drive local governments’ decisions in the
same direction, yielding a positive sign of the interactions’ coeﬃcient, but not a specific pat-
tern in the type of communes in interactions. The coeﬃcient of interaction with the uniform
matrix is significant, as seen in column 3. To go beyond Manski’s critique, we estimate the
coeﬃcient for the contiguity matrix after checking for common trends. In column 4, we see
that the neighbouring interaction coeﬃcient remains significantly positive: local governments
actually interact with each other.24 Moreover, the placebo matrix (column 5) does not show
any evidence of strategic interactions. Interactions among jurisdictions that are geographically
or ethnically close are not an artefact of our estimation procedure. Note that in Table 5, we
also establish that there were no strategic interactions before 1998, when the decentralisation
process began in Benin.25
We conclude that there are strategic interactions between neighbouring jurisdictions. More-
over, public spending are strategic complements as in most empirical studies.26 An average
increase of 10 percent in the neighbouring jurisdictions’ public spending induces an increase of
around 6.2 percent in local expenditure. These interactions also exist between communes that
are ethnically close, though they are less important (5.1 percent).27 Columns 7 and 8 provide
some robustness tests of these results. We consider some alternative matrices: the 2 ma-
trix, in which the value of 1 is assigned if two communes belong to the same departeent and 0
otherwise; the 2 matrix where the value of 1 is assigned if two communes have the same
23 As this coeﬃcient provides an estimate  varying between 0.411 and 0.629, the result indicates some level
of persistence in public expenditure.
24 The interactions’ coeﬃcient also remains significantly positive for the ethnic matrix after a similar correction.
25 We run the same regressions as we did previously for the period 1994—1998. The coeﬃcients of interaction
with all matrices are not significant.
26 Note that, in their study of the Public Health Sector in Uganda, Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf (2005)
provide evidence for the hypothesis that spillover eﬀects cause spending on public goods in one district to reduce
spending on public goods in neighboring districts. Local public spending are, in this case, strategic substitutes.
27 Since diﬀerent ethnic groups are located in close geographical areas, we can assume that the geographic
matrix overlies the ethnic matrix. We estimate the coeﬃcient for the ethnic matrix after checking for geographical
interactions in column 6 and it remains significant and stable.
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dominant ethnic group and 0 otherwise. The coeﬃcient of the weighted average vector of the
other local governments’ public spending remains positive and significant at the 5 percent level
for the 2 matrix, and at 10 percent for the ethnic matrix 2.
Columns 9 and 10 concern regression (12), allowing us to appreciate the eﬀect of the com-
munes’ wealth constraints. As expected, the coeﬃcient of the interaction variable between
neighbours’ spending decisions and the indicator of fiscal autonomy () is positive and signif-
icant. Moreover the coeﬃcient for strategic interaction alone () is no longer significant. We
unambiguously conclude that strategic interactions only exist between unconstrained local gov-
ernments. Finally, in considering the proposed control variables, we observe the opportunistic
behavior of local jurisdictions, since dummies associated with the pre-election years indicate
an increase in public spending.28 Moreover, having a local government with the same political
aﬃliation as the president in oﬃce increases public expenditure, too.29
Our empirical work suggests that decentralisation has induced interjurisdictional strategic
interactions among Beninese communes with regard to current expenditures that appear to
be strategic complements. Moreover, our results confirm that such strategic interactions are
contingent on communes’ respective fiscal autonomy in this developing country.
4 Discussion
Before concluding, we return to some potential explanations for the existence of interjurisdic-
tional spillovers, more specifically concerning two mechanisms of the competition principle,
the interjursidictional migration, that is, the Tiebout hypothesis, and the electoral pressure,
or yardstick competition. The existence of interjurisdictional interactions we have established
leads us to reconsider these arguments.
Despite the lack of relevant data, we may mention some facts concerning interjurisdic-tional
migrations in Benin. It is evident that diﬀerences in relative demographic growth of Beninese
28 To understand the sign of the coeﬃcient associated with the election year dummy, one must refer to the
election calendar and budget votes. Local elections take place at the beginning of March, and the definitive
budget must be adopted before March 31. Therefore, in the year before the elections, decision makers increase
current expenditures and decrease them the year after, since the definitive budget is approved.
29 Note that we find a positive and significant sign for the parameter associated with the employment rate,
which indicates the eﬀect of economic conjuncture. The trend variable remains, as expected, significant and
negative. Indeed, per capita public expenditure has decreased by 75 percent over the period, despite little growth
between 2004 and 2006.
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communes cannot be explained by diﬀerences in birth rate alone. For instance, Abomey-Calavi,
a dynamic commune spreading over Cotonou, has an annual population growth rate of 9.44
percent, while Boukoumbe, a highly rural commune, has an annual population growth rate
of 0.41 percent. Internal migrations exist in Benin and seem to be largely guided by the
opportunities oﬀered by cities.30 The migration’s motives are various31–schooling, job search
or family ties–but could be connected, at least partially, to the provision of public goods at
the local level, as is the case in developed countries. Moreover, these migrations occur generally
between communes belonging to the same department,32 which could explain the existence of
strategic interactions between geographically proximate communes.
Since our dataset covers two local elections (2003 and 2008), we are able to extend our
preceding empirical analysis to test the existence of some kind of yardstick competition among
Beninese communes During the electoral period, political campaigns should increase interac-
tions among local governments, since more information is available on the fiscal policies of
local decision makers, thereby inducing or reinforcing a yardstick competition eﬀect. Hence,
the empirical challenge lies in evaluating the impact of elections on strategic interactions. A
straightforward way to test such an eﬀect is to interact the neighbours’ spending decisions ()
with the dummy for the election years, and estimate two diﬀerent interaction coeﬃcients, one
for years of election () and one for all the other periods ().33 If elections actually
reinforce the exposure of jurisdictions, we should observe the coeﬃcient of ( × ) being
more significant and higher than the coeﬃcient of ( × ) as policymakers should be
particularly concerned about their neighbours’ decisions during election periods.
Insert Table 6
30 The analysis of the migrants’ distribution (Third Census of Population and Housing, 2002) shows that the
départements of Atlantique and Littoral, which are the most urbanized, welcome 41.3 percent of migrants, which
is more than 4 migrants in 10.
31 Third Census of Population and Housing (2002).
32 For instance, in the department of Couﬀo, more than half of the migrants lived in the same department.
Moves between contiguous departments are also important; more than half of the immigrants of the department
of Atlantique lived in the department of Littoral.
33 Formally, we test:
 = −1 + 0( ×) + 00( ×) + 1 + 2
+3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 +  +  (13)
where  = −1 + and  = (1− (−1 +)).
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As expected, Table 6 shows that the coeﬃcient is slightly higher and more significant in election
periods than in other periods with both matrices, indicating that expenditure decisions are
slightly more dependent on neighbours during election periods. However, Wald tests do not
indicate that coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent at the 10 percent level. Yardstick competition
may have some eﬀect, but it is not the main channel of communes’ interactions.
5 Conclusion
The aim of our paper was to study local governments’ interactions in Benin. These interactions
could be very modest, given the scarcity of local public resources. We show that this is not the
case. Indeed, we establish that decentralisation in Benin entails interjurisdictional interactions.
These interactions are not a common trend. They exist not only among neighbouring local
jurisdictions but also among communes that are close in terms of ethnic composition. We also
emphasise both the influence of partisan aﬃliation, and the opportunistic behaviour of local
governments before elections. This African democracy appears to be as concerned as developed
democracies with strategic fiscal interactions.
The existence of strategic complementarity among local governments in developing countries
may have some attractive consequences for the issue of decentralisation in these coun-tries. In
the game theory literature, strategic complementarity is often associated with the multiplicity
of Nash equilibria, then with a coordination issue.34 In the context of decentralisation in de-
veloping countries, our results mean that several equilibria may exist and some may be Pareto
dominated. A theoretical indecision then remains on the final eﬀect of decentralization on the
population’s welfare. This inconclusiveness may only be solved through further empirical stud-
ies. However, strategic complementarity may also induce some interesting features, particularly
in the context of foreign aid. Assume, for instance, that a commune receives foreign aid, which
leads to an increase local public spending. Due to strategic complementarity, such an increase
will induce similar variations in public spending in neighbouring communes. A multiplier com-
parable to the social multiplier put forward by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003)
results from strategic complementarity and positive spillovers. This multiplier, which remains
to be evaluated in Benin, and more broadly, in African countries, may reinforce the appeal of
34 In contrast, strategic substitutability raises the question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
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decentralized foreign aid.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figure and Tables
Map 1: Administrative map of Benin
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Map 2: Ethnic fragmentation
27
Alibori
Borgou
Atakora
Collines
Donga
Zou
Mono
Plateau
Kouffo
AtlantiqueOuémé
Littoral
8
4
2
1
6
3
9
7
5
24
22
26
10
17
11
18
66
67
63
68
13
14
73
21
64
65
19
61
2015
23
37
16
25
77
35
27
32
76
28
12
41
58
62
60
33
54
74
31
72
40
44
75
29
48 50
39
47 30
46
38
70
3443
45
59
71
69
55
51 57
42
53
4936
0 50 10025 Kilometers
-1.82 - -1.00
-1.00 - 0.00
0.00 - 0.10
0.10 - 2.00
2.00 - 4.65
37
77
73 61
35
32
28
41
58
62
60
40
76
44
75
29
33
54
48
50
39
74
72
47
30
31
38
70
34
43
45
7169
55
51
42
53
46
59
57
52
4956
36
Source: http://www.gadm.org/country; Author's calculations
Map 3: DHS (poverty) score
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Table 1: Estimation results for the presence of scale economies - Specic e¤ects
Dependent variable: Current expenditure of commune (;)
Population density 2.540** (1.41)
Squared Population density 0.001*** (0.00)
Haussman test: p-value 0.34
Observations 429
Robust standard errors are in brackets.***: co e¢ cient sign icant at 1 p ercent level, ** : at 5 p ercent level, * : at 10 p ercent level.
Table 2: LM tests - Spatial lag and spatial error dependence
Weighting scheme (1)  (2) 
LMlag (p-value) 13.33 (0.001) 11.97 (0.005)
LMerr (p-value) 1.35 (0.25) 0.60 (0.43)
Observations 462 462
29
Table 3: Estimation results with spatial lag dependence - ML estimator
Dependent variable: Current expenditure of ‘commune’  (;)
Weighting scheme (1)  (2) 
Spending in city  0.255*** (0.07) 0.443** (0.19)
Population density 0.025 (0.06) 0.022 (0.06)
Employment rate -0.003 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01)
Trade openness 0.115** (0.05) 0.167*** (0.05)
Partisan Aﬃliation 0.288** (0.11) 0.244** (0.11)
Trend -0.124** (0.05) -0.065** (0.01)
Election year t-1 0.214** (0.09) 0.169* (0.10)
Election year t -0.666*** (0.19) -0.361 (0.30)
Election year t+1 -0.568*** (0.09) -0.549*** (0.10)
Log-likelihood -206.54 -207.57
N 462 462
Robust standard errors are in brackets.***: co eﬃ cient sign ifi cant at 1 p ercent level, **: at 5 p ercent level, * : at 10 p ercent level.  
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Table 4: Estimation results for dynamic model - GMM-System35
Dependent variable: Current expenditure of commune  (;)
Weighting scheme (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 2 (8) 2 (9)  (10) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.569***
(0.22)
0.527***
(0.21)
0.580**
(0.22)
0.411**
(0.20)
0.629***
(0.21)
0.403**
(0.19)
0.410*
(0.27)
0.768***
(0.14)
0.678***
(0.21)
0.652***
(0.21)
Spending in communes  0.623**
(0.28)
0.513***
(0.19)
0.384*
(0.20)
0.472**
(0.19)
-0.202
(0.20)
0.468***
(0.18)
0.653***
(0.18)
0.769**
(0.32)
0.155
(0.40)
0.130
(0.33)
Population density 0.104
(0.11)
0.252**
(0.11)
0.222*
(0.12)
0.179
(0.12)
0.173
(0.10)
0.210*
(0.12)
0.275
(0.12)
0.101
(0.08)
0.088
(0.11)
0.158
(0.10)
Employment rate 0.052***
(0.02)
0.020*
(0.01)
0.011*
(0.008)
0.061***
(0.01)
0.015
(0.01)
0.060***
(0.01)
0.059***
(0.01)
0.037**
(0.01)
0.032**
(0.01)
0.017*
(0.01)
Trade openness -0.080
(0.06)
-0.073
(0.07)
-0.094
(0.08)
-0.001
(0.07)
-0.148**
(0.07)
-0.025
(0.07)
-0.054
(0.08)
-0.106
(0.07)
-0.117*
(0.06)
-0.135*
(0.07)
Partisan Aﬃliation 0.395**
(0.15)
0.722**
(0.31)
0.239
(0.18)
0.612***
(0.21)
0.143
(0.15)
0.953***
(0.31)
0.528**
(0.23)
0.813**
(0.33)
0.131
(0.38)
0.453*
(0.35)
Trend -0.469***
(0.11)
-0.285***
(0.09)
-0.297***
(0.10)
-0.347***
(0.11)
- 0.419***
(0.05)
-0.345***
(0.10)
-0.443***
(0.09)
-0.419***
(0.06)
-0.512***
(0.11)
-0.463*
(0.09)
Election year t-1 0.347***
(0.11)
0.294**
(0.13)
0.348**
(0.14)
0.207**
(0.11)
0.434***
(0.10)
0.190*
(0.11)
0.305***
(0.10)
0.343***
(0.11)
0.494***
(0.17)
0.584***
(0.16)
Election year t -0.055
(0.02)
-0.482**
(0.24)
-0.502**
(0.25)
0.672
(0.42)
-1.077***
(0.39)
-0.244
(0.38)
-0.215
(0.49)
-0.241
(0.53)
-0.044
(0.63)
-0.112
(0.29)
Election year t+1 -0.307**
(0.12)
-0.357***
(0.09)
-0.391***
(0.09)
-0.090*
(0.11)
-0.569***
(0.10)
-0.318
(0.10)
-0.318***
(0.11)
-0.257*
(0.14)
-0.497**
(0.19)
-0.567***
(0.11)
Spending in neighbours

0.794***
(0.20)
0.617**
(0.20)
Interact term   0.592**
(0.25)
0.673**
(0.32)
Fiscal autonomy -4.405**
(1.78)
-4.784*
(2.56)
AR(1) test: p-value 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.030 0.000 0.001 0.000
AR(2) test: p-value 0.240 0.138 0.101 0.300 0.102 0.315 0.425 0.209 0.117 0.152
Hansen test: p-value 0.176 0.201 0.126 0.568 0.007 0.502 0.403 0.130 0.242 0.584
Nb of instruments 19 19 19 28 19 28 19 19 25 25
Nb of units 63 63 63 63 63 63 62 62 63 63
N 324 324 324 324 324 324 319 318 324 324
35
Robust standard errors. are in brackets.***: co eﬃ cient sign ifi cant at 1 % level, ** : at 5 % level, *: at 10 % level. We adopt the assumption of weak exogeneity of employment rates and trade op enness.
The weighted average vector of p er capita pub lic sp end ing of other lo cal governments is, as noted b efore , susp ected of endogeneity. O ther explanatory variables (Popu lation density, tim e dumm ies, election
dumm ies, partisan aﬃ liation, trends) are assum ed to b e strictly exogenous. The lagged levels of variables are used as instrum ents in the regressions in level as well as in the regressions in d iﬀ erence. We
collapse instruments and lim it the number. The lags of at least two earlier p eriods for weak exogenous variab les and three earlier p eriods for endogenous variab les are used as instruments. The lagged
dep endent variable is instrum ented by lags of the dep endent variable from at least two earlier p eriods. We use two lags for endogenous and weak exogenous variables.
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Table 5: Estimation results for dynamic model 1994-1998 - GMM-System36
Dependent variable: Current expenditure of commune  (;)
Weighting scheme (1)  (2)  (3) 2 (4) 2
Lagged dep. var. 0.835***
(0.14)
0.872***
(0.12)
0.887***
(0.11)
0.965***
(0.10)
Spending in communes  -0.093
(0.13)
0.205
(0.25)
0.002
(0.35)
0.926
(0.85)
Population density 0.082
(0.05)
0.061
(0.04)
0.041
(0.02)
0.001
(0.05)
Employment rate 0.012
(0.01)
0.008
(0.01)
0.001
(0.01)
0.005
(0.01)
Trade openness -0.001
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.005)
Partisan Aﬃliation 0.095
(0.12)
0.225
(0.23)
0.022
(0.07)
0.001
(0.08)
Trend -0.001
(0.11)
-0.038
(0.04)
-0.001
(0.03)
-0.168
(0.14)
AR(1) test: p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR(2) test: p-value 0.840 0.726 0.881 0.751
Hansen test: p-value 0.262 0.467 0.494 0.553
Nb of instruments 16 16 16 16
Nb of units 63 63 62 63
N 241 241 237 241
36
Robust standard errors. are in brackets.***: co eﬃ cient sign ifi cant at 1 % level, ** : at 5 % level, *: at 10 % level. We adopt the assumption of weak exogeneity of employment rates and trade op enness.
The weighted average vector of p er capita pub lic sp end ing of other lo cal governments is, as noted b efore , susp ected of endogeneity. O ther explanatory variables (Popu lation density, tim e dumm ies, election
dumm ies, partisan aﬃ liation, trends) are assum ed to b e strictly exogenous. The lagged levels of variables are used as instrum ents in the regressions in level as well as in the regressions in d iﬀ erence. We
collapse instruments and lim it the number. The lags of at least two earlier p eriods for weak exogenous variab les and three earlier p eriods for endogenous variab les are used as instruments. The lagged
dep endent variable is instrum ented by lags of the dep endent variable from at least two earlier p eriods. We use two lags for endogenous and weak exogenous variables.   
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Table 6: Testing for yardstick competition - GMM-System37
Dependent variable: Current expenditure of ‘commune’  (;)
Weighting scheme (2)  (2)  (3) 2 (4) 2
Spending in non election years 0.915***
(0.11)
1.239***
(0.12)
0.897***
(0.14)
1.013***
(0.11)
Spending in election years 0.989***
(0.09)
1.289***
(0.13)
1.002***
(0.09)
1.449***
(0.26)
Lagged dep. var. 0.569***
(0.22)
0.434**
(0.24)
0.695***
(0.21)
0.521*
(0.29)
Population density 0.052
(0.11)
0.333***
(0.12)
0.190*
(0.10)
0.222
(0.16)
Employment rate 0.068***
(0.01)
0.031**
(0.01)
0.070***
(0.01)
0.068***
(0.02)
Trade openness -0.138*
(0.07)
-0.020
(0.08)
-0.212***
(0.07)
-0.016
(0.11)
Partisan Aﬃliation 0.476**
(0.24)
1.510***
(0.28)
0.507**
(0.22)
1.462***
(0.36)
Trend -0.430***
(0.08)
-0.097
(0.08)
-0.482***
(0.07)
-0.365***
(0.12)
Election years -0.387
(0.40)
0.353
(0.76)
-0.570
(0.72)
3.577*
(2.17)
AR(1) test: p-value 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.201
AR(2) test: p-value 0.193 0.186 0.517 0.106
Hansen test: p-value 0.153 0.123 0.492 0.125
Wald test: p-value 0.157 0.438 0.264 0.112
Nb of instruments 20 20 20 20
Nb of units 62 63 62 62
N 324 324 319 318
37
Robust standard errors. are in brackets.***: co eﬃ cient sign ifi cant at 1 % level, ** : at 5 % level, *: at 10 % level. We adopt the assumption of weak exogeneity of employment rates and trade op enness.
The weighted average vector of p er capita pub lic sp end ing of other lo cal governments is, as noted b efore , susp ected of endogeneity. O ther explanatory variables (Popu lation density, tim e dumm ies, election
dumm ies, partisan aﬃ liation, trends) are assum ed to b e strictly exogenous. The lagged levels of variables are used as instrum ents in the regressions in level as well as in the regressions in d iﬀ erence. We
collapse instruments and lim it the number. The lags of at least two earlier p eriods for weak exogenous variab les and three earlier p eriods for endogenous variab les are used as instruments. The lagged
dep endent variable is instrum ented by lags of the dep endent variable from at least two earlier p eriods. We use two lags for endogenous and weak exogenous variables.
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